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When MIRA Liens Trump Attorney Fee
Claims: A Harsh Result in Light of Karpierz?
State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act ("MIRA") is a powerful
tool which allows the State to recover incarceration costs directly from an
inmate's personal assets.2 But what if the inmate's assets include funds
obtained in some fashion by the legal services of an attorney? Could a
subsequent MIRA claim take priority over that attorney's interest in being
paid from the fruit of his labor? In the 2003 case of State ex reL. Nixon v.
Karpierz, the Missouri Supreme Court sought to provide answers to these
questions.3 Karpierz placed a limitation on the parameters of MIRA's reach
by allowing a plaintiff inmate's attorney to take a reasonable fee for legal
services performed in obtaining a judgment prior to the attachment of the
MIRA claim.4
In the factually similar case of State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Western District made no mention of Karpierz.5 This Note
argues that in deciding Bass, the Missouri Court of Appeals should have
discussed the Karpierz holding in order to provide more clear and definitive
guidance for attorneys who undertake the representation of inmates.
Particularly helpful would have been some direction regarding whether and
when Karpierz might be invoked to protect from MIRA's grasp a legal fee
arising from an attorney's active defense of an inmate.
1. No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008), transfer
granted, No. SC 89666 (Mo. Dec. 16, 2008). On March 31, 2009, the Missouri
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the State and remanded for a hearing on the merits. State ex rel. Nixon v.
Bass, No. SC89666, at 6 (Mo. Mar. 31, 2009) (en banc), available at http://
www.courts.mo.gov/file/OpinionSC89666.pdf. For a discussion of this opinion, see
infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
2. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 217.825-.841 (2000).
3. 105 S.W.3d 487 (2003) (en banc).
4. Id. at 491.
5. 2008 WL 3833712, at *1-4.
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I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On March 29, 2006, Loren Bass ("Bass") was arrested in Cole County,
Missouri for drug related offenses. 6 At the time of the arrest, Bass was in
possession of $4421.00 in cash, which was seized by the arresting officers for
forfeiture 7pursuant to Missouri's Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act
("CAFA"). Shortly after being formally charged with drug possession, Bass
hired the law firm of Hanrahan Trapp, P.C. ("Hanrahan") as legal counsel and
agreed to pay a $10,000.00 legal fee.8 Bass paid Hanrahan $5600.00 up front
and indicated that he would pay the remaining portion by assigning his
interest in the seized cash to the firm.9 He signed a document entitled
"Authorization for the Release of Funds by Inmate," which provided:
I, Loren Bass, hereby authorize the release of any and all of my
funds currently in the possession of Cole County, Missouri
(believed to be approximately $4421.00) to the firm of Hanrahan
Trapp, PC as the initial retainer for legal representation fees.
10
On June 12, 2006, Bass pled guilty to a lesser criminal charge and
received a three year prison sentence. At the plea hearing, Hanrahan filed a
motion for release of the seized funds and the defense's interest was recorded
6. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662,
2008 WL 3833712 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008); see also Bass, 2008 WL
3833712, at *1.
7. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *1. On April 3, 2006, the State, seeking an
order of forfeiture, filed a separate civil suit for possession of the seized funds under
CAFA. Id. The statutory provisions for CAFA are found at Mo. REV. STAT. §§
513.600-.645 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
8. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *1; Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at
2. "Bass was formally charged in Cole County" on March 31, 2006, and Hanrahan
was retained by Bass a week later, on April 7, 2006. Id.
9. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
10. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *2. This document was not dated, but Bass later
swore by affidavit that it was executed on April 13, 2006. Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 6, at 3.
11. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *1; Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at
3. According to an affidavit signed by the prosecuting attorney assigned to Bass'
criminal case, there was
a negotiated testimonial agreement with Hanrahan ... [where] the State.
• . agreed to permit Bass to plead guilty to a reduced charge and to
dismiss the said forfeiture action in exchange for Bass' testimony in
several other cases. The State agreed to dismiss said action knowing that
Defendant Bass would use the seized funds to pay outstanding legal fees
owed to Hanrahan.
Affidavit of Randall M. England 1 5 (Nov. 29, 2006), in Legal File at 98, State ex reL
Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug. 19,2008).
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in the criminal case docket.12 The State dismissed its CAFA petition four
days later. 13 On the day that the CAFA action was dismissed, then-State
Attorney General Jay Nixon filed a petition against Bass for incarceration
reimbursement under MIRA, claiming the seized funds as compensation for
Bass' prison expenses. 14  Hanrahan intervened in the case, arguing that,
pursuant to the signed authorization, the money was no longer Bass' property
but rather belonged to the law firm. 15 In support of its position, Hanrahan
utilized the Missouri Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of the
definition of a MIRA "asset" as announced in the case of State ex rel. Nixon
v. Karpierz.
16
Nixon subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, pointing out
that Hanrahan's position implied that the authorization si7ned by Bass created
an assignment of Bass' full interest in the seized money. Nixon argued that
the authorization was not a valid assignment for two reasons. First, he
asserted that the document merely authorized the release of money for a
12. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 3; Docket Entry, Guilty Plea,
State v. Bass, No. 06AC-CRO0810-01 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June 12, 2006), available
at https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do.
13. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 3. While it is evident from the
record that Hanrahan carried out Bass' criminal defense, it is not clear whether the
firm actively represented Bass in the CAFA case. See Docket Entry, Parties and
Attorneys, State v. Bass, No. 06AC-CR00810-01 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June 12,
2006), available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do (Hanrahan
on record as counsel); Docket Entry, Parties and Attorneys, State ex rel. Tackett v.
Bass, No. 06AC-CC00252 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June 16, 2006), available at
https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do (no attorney on record as
counsel); Affidavit of Lorne Bass 6 (June 28, 2006), in Legal File at 37, State ex rel.
Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008)
("I retained Hanrahan Trapp, P.C., to represent me in Case No. 06AC-CRO08 10.").
14. Id. at 3-4; Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *1. For the statutory provisions of
MIRA, see Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 217.825-.841 (2000).
15. Intervenor's Answer to Petition for Incarceration Reimbursement 14, State
ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. 06AC-CC00469 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June 16, 2006), in
Legal File at 48, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712 (Mo.
App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008). Hanrahan also claimed that the MIRA action interfered
with and violated the testimonial agreement entered in the criminal case, whereby
Bass agreed to testify against other defendants in exchange for a lesser plea
arrangement, the State's dismissal of the CAFA case and the release of the seized
funds for payment of Bass' attorney fees. ld. 15-16; see also Appellant's Opening
Brief, supra note 6, at 3.
16. 105 S.W.3d 487, 490-91 (Mo. 2003). For the court's reasoning in Karpierz,
see infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
17. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *1; Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at
3; Suggestions in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-5, State
ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. 06AC-CC00469 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June 16, 2006), in
Legal File at 74, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712 (Mo.
App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008).
2009]
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specified use.18  Thus, there was no full assignment of Bass' interest to
Hanrahan. 19 Second, Nixon argued that, to be valid, an assignment must
transfer the assignor's full interest in the property to the assignee.
20
Specifically, he relied on the fact that Bass signed the authorization at a time
when the seized funds were the subject of the CAFA action. 21 Thus, because
the authorization was an agreement to transfer the money at a future point in
time, "[t]he release did not vest any present interest in the funds."
22
The trial court granted Nixon's motion for summary judgment on June
29, 2007, and awarded the State $4845.14 in incarceration expenses. 23 It then
held that the funds seized from Bass were subject to the incarceration
reimbursement judgment.24 The court was silent regarding the legal effect of
the authorization signed by Bass.
On July 24, 2007, Hanrahan filed its notice of appeal to the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Western District. 26 On appeal, the primary issue raised
was the same argument presented in the lower court - that the funds at issue
did not belong to Bass because they were assigned to Hanrahan before the
MIRA action was filed.27 Nixon, in addition to the arguments presented at
the summary judgment hearing, raised two new points on appeal. First, he
asserted that, at the time the authorization was signed, "Hanrahan ... had not
undertaken [its] representation of Bass." 28 "As such . . . [the] assignment
could only be considered contingent, [thus] Bass must have retained an
18. Suggestions in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 17, at 4-5.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 4-5. Nixon also argued that Hanrahan's assertion that the MIRA action
interfered with Bass' plea agreement lacked merit, pointing to the fact that the
Testimonial Agreement on file in the criminal case contained no reference to the
dismissal of the CAFA case. Id. at 5-6.
23. Docket Entry, Judgment Entered, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. 06AC-
CC00469 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June 16, 2006), available at https://www.
courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do.
24. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 9; Docket Entry, Judgment
Entered, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. 06AC-CC00469 (Cole County Cir. Ct. June
16, 2006), available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do.
25. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 6-7.
26. Docket Entry, Appeal Filed, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. 06AC-CC00469
(Cole County Cir. Ct. June 16, 2006), available at https://www.courts.mo
.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do.
27. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 1. Again, Hanrahan relied on
Karpierz. Id. at 13. The firm also relied on Greater Kansas City Baptist &
Community Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Businessmen's Assurance Co., 585 S.W.2d 118
(Mo. App. W.D. 1979). Id. at 17-18. For a discussion of this case, see the text
accompanying infra note 104.
28. Respondent's Brief at 14, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662, 2008
WL 3833712 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008).
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interest in the funds. ' 2 9 Second, Nixon argued that because Bass retained an
interest in the funds, the most that Hanrahan obtained through the
authorization was a secured interest in the funds, over which the MIRA claim
had priority.
30
In making its decision, the appellate court focused primarily on the use
of the phrase "initial retainer for legal representation fees" in Hanahan's
authorization.3 ' It explained that, in the attorney-client context, such words
describe funds that do not belong to the lawyer until they are earned. 32 Thus,
the court held, when an attorney accepts a client's signed authorization of a
release of funds held by a third party as an advance fee payment, until the fee
is earned by the attorney, the client retains an interest in the funds which may
either be reclaimed by the client or executed against by a priority claim such
as that which arises under MIRA.33
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully understand and analyze the issues in the instant case, it
is necessary to examine generally the nature of a MIRA claim and its effects
on attorney fees. Additionally, it is important to explore the laws in Missouri
as they apply to attorney fees. Each of these topics will be discussed in turn.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *3 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. In a separate opinion, a dissenting judge argued that summary judgment
was improper because there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether Bass' attorney earned its fee. Id. at *4 (Ahuja, J., concurring in part and
dissenting). The dissent recommended remanding for further development of the
facts and consideration of the matter in light of the Missouri Supreme Court's holding
in State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). Id. at *6.
On December 16, 2008 the Missouri Supreme court granted Hanrahan's request for
transfer. Docket Entry, Transfer Granted, State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. SC89666
(Mo. Dec. 16, 2008), available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/
welcome.do.
In its opinion on March 31, 2009, the Missouri Supreme Court expressed its
agreement with the appellate dissenting opinion, reversed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the State, and remanded the matter to the trial court for hearing
on the merits. State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. SC89666, at 4-6 (Mo. Mar. 31, 2009)
(en banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file/OpinionSC89666.pdf. For a
discussion of this opinion, see infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
2009]
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A. The Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act
The State's petition in the instant case was filed pursuant to the Missouri
Incarceration Reimbursement Act, also known as MIRA.34 Enacted in 1988,
MIRA provides an avenue for recovering "the cost of caring for and
maintaining prisoners in the Missouri Department of Corrections."35 Under
MIRA, Missouri may claim up to ninety percent of a prisoner's assets as
reimbursement for the costs of incarceration. 3 6 Assets are defined as any
"property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due an
offender."37 The act further provides that a MIRA claim is superior over
almost all other obligations attached to a prisoner's assets.
38
An exception to MIRA's ability to reach a prisoner's assets, designed to
protect attorney fees, was created by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex
rel. Nixon v. Karpierz.39 In Karpierz, a Missouri prisoner was awarded a civil
judgment in the amount of $46,470.04.4o The State then filed a MIRA suit
34. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 217.825-.841 (2000). For the purposes of this note,
the primary focus will be on the law as it is applied in Missouri.
35. State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487, 488 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
36. Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.833.1 (2000).
37. Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.827(l)(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
38. Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.837.4 (2000).
39. 105 S.W.3d 487. Other limitations are found in the statutory language itself.
For example, Mo. REv. STAT. § 217.831.3 (2000) requires the state attorney general
to first prove that the claim made will result in an amount recovered of at least "ten
percent of' either the "estimated [total] cost of care [or the] estimated cost of care...
for two years, whichever is less." Cost of incarceration is calculated on a "per capita
cost" basis for the time period in which the prisoner is "in a state correctional center."
Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.833.2. Another example is found in the section defining the
word "asset," which allows exclusions for homesteads and the first $2,500.00 of an
inmate's "wages and bonuses ... paid [to] the offender while he or she was confined
to a state correctional center." Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.827(l)(b). Other limitations
arise from sources external to the act's provisions. For example, one significant
group of exceptions to the enforcement of MIRA claims arise under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, which mandates federal preemption of state law. See, e.g.,
Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 1992) ("conclud[ing] that [42 U.S.C.
§] 1983 preempts the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act" from executing
against a federal civil rights judgment); State ex rel. Nixon v. McClure, 969 S.W.2d
801, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (holding that 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a)'s prohibition of
execution against federal disability payments preempted MIRA); Bennett v. Arkansas,
485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988) (holding that the Supremacy Clause preempted an Arkansas
reimbursement act similar to MIRA, prohibiting it from attaching to funds disbursed
under the Social Security Act (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (Supp. 1982))).
40. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d at 488. Karpierz filed a civil action against the Kansas
City Board of Police Commissioners claiming that the Board violated Missouri's
Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act. Id. In granting judgment for Karpierz under a
theory of assumpsit, the trial court determined that a state law enforcement officer
violated mandatory CAFA notice requirements by unlawfully turning over seized
[Vol. 74
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for incarceration expenses, seeking to attach its claim to the civil award."
The trial court thereafter awarded to the State incarceration costs in the
amount of $36,854.43.42 Karpierz's attorney from the civil case appealed the
MIRA award, arguing that he was entitled to his full attorney fee before the
State's claim attached.4 3  The State responded that, pursuant to Missouri
Revised Statute § 217.837.4, the State's lien for expenses of incarceration had
priority over other liens and, thus, the State's interest trumped the attorney's
contingent fee lien on the judgment.44
In making its decision in Karpierz, the Missouri Supreme Court first
pointed out that, contrary to the State's argument, the issue was not one of
lien priority. 45  Instead, the resolution of the matter depended upon the
legislature's definition of an "asset.'4 6 Particularly, the court focused on the
MIRA statutory provision defining an asset as "'property ... belonging to or
due an offender." Using simple statutory construction techniques, 8 the
court determined that, while the civil defendant was liable to Karpierz for the
full award, what was actually due to the inmate was something less.49 What
"rightfully belong[edl to Karpierz" for MIRA purposes was only the amount
of the judgment in excess of the attorney fees and expenses.50 This lesser
amount was the asset which was subject to the State's MIRA claim.51
The court's rationale for this holding was twofold. First, the court
reasoned that to hold otherwise "would give the State not only the proceeds
of a judgment it could not access without the [contribution] of [a] private
attorney, but also the attorney fees necessary to procure that judgment." 52
Second, the court stated that this outcome supported public policy in that it
encouraged attorneys to represent inmates.
53
Thus, it is apparent that the key inquiry becomes whether a particular
attorney fee to be paid from an inmate's assets falls within the scope of
Karpierz's asset exception. If Karpierz does apply, the MIRA lien would
funds directly to federal authorities. Karpierz v. Easley, 68 S.W.3d 565, 569, 571,
573-74 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).
41. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d at 488.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 489.
45. Id. at 490.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 489 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 217.827 (2000)).
48. The court "look[ed] to the plain and ordinary meaning of the word[s]," cited
dictionary definitions and employed "common sense" to reach a "sound resolution."
Id. at 490.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 490 n. 12 (emphasis added to "belong[ed]").
51. Id. at 491.
52. Id. The court also acknowledged the inherent risk assumed by the attorney in
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only attach to any amount remaining in the "pool" of recovered funds after
attorney fees and expenses have been deducted. If the scope of the Karpierz
exception is so narrow as to make it inapplicable in a given situation, then the
"traditional" rules regarding attorney fees and contracts should be utilized to
determine which party's interest prevails.5 4 These traditional rules will be
discussed next.
B. The "Traditional" Rules of Attorney Fees
In Missouri, attorney fees are traditionally regulated by the courts'
judgment and application of Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct and, to a
lesser extent, by application of statutes and common law. In addition to
exploring these traditional rules, it is important to the analysis of the instant
case to explore the concepts of earned fees versus advanced fee payments and
the different connotations the word "retainer" may assume in attorney fee
agreements. Each of these topics will be covered in turn.
The regulation of attorneys, including their fee agreements, is generallIy
handled by the courts, primarily through the rules of professional conduct.
Courts also look to statutes and the common law for guidance. 56 To gain an
understanding of the regulation process, each area of the law will be
addressed separately.
The Missouri Supreme Court, through its promulgation of rules of
professional conduct, is the ultimate authority on the supervision and
regulation of Missouri attorneys.5 7 Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct 4-
1.5 specifically governs attorney fees. 58 This rule requires that attorneys
54. This seems to be the path taken by the majority opinion in Bass. See State ex
rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712, at *1-3 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug.
19, 2008), transfer granted, No. SC 89666 (Mo. Dec. 16, 2008).
55. Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 994 (Mo. 1937) (en banc) (Ellison, C.J.,
concurring). "It is the inherent power [of courts] to protect their own existence and
functioning as constitutional courts, which includes the right to regulate the practice
of law." Id.
56. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 484.010-.350 (2000 & Supp. 2008) (chapter entitled
"Attorneys At Law"). For an example of a court's reference to the common law of
attorney fees, see Orr v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 207 S.W.2d 511,
515 (Mo. App. W.D. 1947) (describing a "common law 'retaining lien').
57. See generally Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.1 to -9.1. See also Law Offices of
Gary Green, P.C. v. Morrissey, 210 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006) ("'The
rules of professional conduct have the force and effect of judicial decision."' (quoting
Londoffv. Vuylsteke, 996 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999))).
58. Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.5. This rule incorporated the American Bar
Association's Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 in its entirety and added an
additional section which requires an attorney to "conscientiously consider
participating in [an] appropriate fee dispute resolution program" if "a fee dispute
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communicate the "scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee
and expenses for which the client will be responsible" to the client "before or
within a reasonable time after commencing the representation., 59  An
exception is made when an attorney has a regular client who is charged the
same rate for services.60 The rule does not require that the communication be
in writing, but recommends that it be.
6 1
Notably absent from Rule 4-1.5 is any direct mandate controlling the
amount that an attorney may charge or the manner in which the fee is
implemented. Instead, the rule simply requires that the fee charged be
"reasonable. ' 62 Reasonableness of a fee is determined according to a set of
suggested, but not exclusive, factors. 63 Factors considered are the amount of
time and work required during the course of the representation, the chances
that taking the client's case will keep the attorney from accepting other work,
the amount normally charged for similar services in the area, the size of the
fee and the results obtained, any time restrictions, the nature and length of the
attorney-client association, the skill, knowledge, reputation and capability of
the attorney, and the nature of the fee arrangement. 64 Another factor in the
reasonableness determination is that, before the attorney may take full
possession and control of the paid amount, it must be earned.
When regulating attorney fee agreements, Missouri courts may take into
consideration, but are not required to follow, the provisions of state statutes.66
There are only two Missouri statutes which directly address attorney fee
contracts. Section 484.130 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri sets out the
67general requirements for a valid attorney fee agreement. It provides that
59. Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.5(b).
60. Id.
61. The comment to Rule 4-1.5 is illuminating. It states:
Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple
memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that
states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate
or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be
responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the
representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the
engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.
Id. at 4-1.5 cmt. 2.
62. Id. at 4-1.5(a).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4-1.5(a)(l)-(8).
65. See id. at 4-1.5 cmt. 4 ("A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but
is obliged to return any unearned portion.").
66. Courts may choose to accept or reject legislative attempts to regulate
attorneys. See In re Conner, 207 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Mo. 1948) (en banc) (stating "this
Court, independent of any other branch of the government, has inherent power to fully
regulate the admission and disbarment of its attorney officers, to accomplish all
objects within its orbit, and to provide procedure by rule").
67. Mo. REv. STAT. § 484.130 (2000).
2009]
9
Williamson: Williamson: When MIRA Liens Trump Attorney Fee Claims
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
"[t]he compensation of an attorney or counselor for his services is governed
by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law." 68 The
remaining portion of § 484.130 codifies the common law charging lien.69 It
provides an attorney with a lien against property obtained in the case filed on
behalf of the client.70 Similarly, § 484.140 provides for contingent fee
charging liens.7 1 As the statutes do not conflict with Rule 4-1.5, Missouri
courts generally accept them.72
Because the courts have "the inherent authority to regulate the practice
of law," the common law is a rich source of regulatory authority. 73 Given the
general nature of the attorney fee provisions in the rules of professional
conduct and state statutes, the courts' "expert" knowledge is often called
upon to resolve the finer points. 74  One such point addressed, perhaps
inconsistently, is the use of the word "retainer" in attorney fee agreements.
75
68. Id.
69. Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Cummins, 268 S.W. 383, 384 (Mo. App. E.D.
1924); see also Ross v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Commc'ns Corp., 836 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Mo.
App. W.D. 1992) ("Section 484.130 restates the common law of Missouri giving an
attorney a lien on his client's cause of action from the commencement of that
action."); Jeffrey Berman, Recent Developments in Missouri: Civil Practice and
Procedure, 48 UMKC L. REv. 513, 513-14 (1980) (discussing the common law
charging lien).
70. Mo. REV. STAT. § 484.130.
71. Mo. REV. STAT. § 484.140 (2000). In addition to the codified charging liens,
a second type of common law lien, known as the "retaining lien," purports to give the
attorney a general right to keep a client's property until the client's debt to his lawyer
is satisfied, thus putting into effect a "passive" lien. Modern Woodmen of Am., 268
S.W. at 384. However, this lien has not been statutorily codified and the availability
of its use is questionable. Compare 2 Mo. PRAC. § 2.15 (4th ed. 2002) ("An attorney
has a 'retaining lien' which permits an attorney to retain a client's property to secure
any unpaid fees." (citing Corrigan v. Armstrong, 824 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. App. E.D.
1992); Orr v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 207 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1947))), with Formal Opinion No. 115 (1979), in 35 J. Mo. B. 340 (1979)
(opinion of the Missouri Bar Advisory Committee stating that the purpose of the
retaining lien is unethical and contra to the professional rules of conduct). See also
Berman, supra note 69, at 513-14 (discussing common law attorney liens).
72. See, e.g., Reed v. Garner Indus., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Mo. App. E.D.
1992).
73. In re Crews, 159 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
74. See, e.g., Travis v. Travis, 174 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) ("The
trial court is considered an expert on the necessity, reasonableness, and value of
attorney's fees."); Tobin v. Jerry, 243 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (court
called on to decide whether Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.5 required a contingent fee
agreement to be a signed writing).
75. Even Black's Law Dictionary reflects the diverse use of the word retainer. It
offers four definitions:
1. A client's authorization for a lawyer to act in a case .... 2. A fee that a
client pays to a lawyer simply to be available when the client needs legal
[Vol. 74
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Some usages of the word are fairly straightforward. For example, the act of
entering into an arrangement whereby a client "engages" an attorney for legal
representation is often called a "'retainer."' 76 The word may also be used as a
verb, where the client is said to "retain" legal counsel. 77 In other situations,
courts have used the word in apparently conflicting fee contexts, which led to
78increased confusion. For example, the same word can be used to describe
seemingly different types of attorney fees, such as a general retainer, special
retainer, minimum retainer, initial retainer, or non-refundable retainer.79
In order to fully assess the issues in State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, it is
necessary to develop a general understanding of the overall types of fees that
attorneys may charge and how the word "retainer" fits into those types. This
discussion can be streamlined by categorizing fees into two basic groups:
earned fees and unearned fees.
Earned fees, as the words imply, are quite simply already earned at the
moment the attorney takes possession of the payment. One fee in this
category is the general retainer.80 A general retainer "is a fee for agreeing to
make legal services available when needed during a specified time period."'
' I
help during a specified period or on a specified matter. 3. A lump-sum fee
paid by the client to engage a lawyer at the outset of a matter .... 4. An
advance payment of fees for work that the lawyer will perform in the
future.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341-42 (8th ed. 2004); see cases cited infra note 78.
76. See Agnew v. Walden, 4 So. 672, 673 (Ala. 1888); see also Lester Brickman,
The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be Deposited to the Client
Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10 CARDOzo L. REv. 647, 649
(1989).
77. See supra note 75.
78. Compare Dowling v. Chi. Options Assocs., Inc. 875 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ill.
2007) (describing three types of retainers: (1) the "'true,' 'general,' or 'classic'
retainer," (an immediately earned fee to ensure a lawyer's availability); (2) the
"'security retainer,"' (meant only to serve as security for future attorney fees); and (3)
the "'advanced payment retainer"' ("payment to the lawyer in exchange for the
commitment to provide legal services in the future")), with In re Connelly, 55 P.3d
756, 762 n.7 (Ariz. 2002) ("A non-refundable fee differs from a non-refundable
retainer or advance payment. Unlike a non-refundable fee, a non-refundable retainer
is 'a fee paid, apart from any other compensation, to ensure that a lawyer will be
available for the client if required' and 'an advance payment [is one] from which fees
will be subtracted."'), and Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof I Ethics & Conduct v.
Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 2003) (categorizing "advance fees ... as
general retainers or special retainers").
79. Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d at 476.
80. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d
50, 54 (Iowa 1998) (citing Brickman, supra note 76, at 649).
81. Id. "In form, [a general retainer] is an option contract; the fee is earned by
the attorney when paid since the attorney is entitled to the money regardless of
whether he actually performs any services for the client." Id. Some authorities prefer
to distinguish the general retainer from what they label the "'special retainer,' [which]
20091
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Thus, by putting an attorney on general retainer, a client is paying to have that
attorney be "on call." The attorney earns the general retainer fee simply by
agreeing to be "on call" for that client, regardless of whether any actual work
is ever performed.
Unearned fees arise when the attorney accepts funds in advance of the
performance of legal services; hence, this type of fee is an "advance fee
payment. '82 These funds technically remain the client's property until the
attorney both earns the fee and takes possession and control of the money.
83
Because the funds belong to the client until they are deemed earned, they
must be kept in the attorney's trust account, and while the funds are in the
trust account, the client retains ultimate control.84 As the attorney earns the
fee, the earned portion may be transferred from trust to the firm operating
account.85  At the end of representation, the attorney must refund any
remaining balance of the advance fee payment to the client.
86
Fees in the advance fee payment category receive a variety of labels,
creating much confusion. Many advance fee payments are correctly
categorized as special retainers. 87 "A special retainer [is said to] cover[]
payment of funds for a specific service," and, to the extent that the special
retainer is paid before services are rendered, is an advance fee payment. "
A common type of special retainer is the flat fee.8 9 A flat fee is an
amount charged that "embraces all work to be done, whether it be relatively
simple and of short duration, or complex and protracted." 90 Because a flat fee
is charged for the entirety of the legal service, it raises the question of
covers payment of funds for a specific [legal] service." Id. at 55. Other fees in this
category would include hourly, contingent fees and any other arrangement where
attorneys receive payment after the work has been performed. Hourly fees are
generally billed after the work time has been incurred and contingent fees are received
upon the attorney's attainment of a funded disposition of the client's claim, thus both
fee types are earned when received by the attorney. See generally 1 ROBERT L. Rossi,
ATTORNEYS' FEES 58-61, 92-94 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing hourly and contingent
fees).
82. Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 55 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(e).
85. Id.; Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 55; see also Nancy L. Ripperger, Trust Account
Recordkeeping: What You Need to Know to Stay out of Trouble, PRECEDENT, Summer
2008, at 21, 23 n.4 (stating that the Missouri Office of Chief Disciplinary Council has
taken the same position).
86. Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.16(d).
87. Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 55 (citing Brickman, supra note 76, at 649).
88. Id.
89. Id. Flat fees are "commonplace for fairly routine and standardized legal
services," such as will preparation or representation in uncontested divorces. Id.
(citing 41 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 306 (1993)).
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whether it is necessary that the payment be placed in the client trust
account. 91 It might be argued that, since the agreed upon fee for the entire
legal service is pre-set, it is non-refundable, thus the fee may be placed
directly into the attorney's operating account. The American Bar
Association's response is that the ethically:
"questionable [application] of non-refundable fee advances [in the
attorney-client context] has inspired some imaginative terminology
designed to characterize the advance payments in a manner that
eludes the issue: retainers, non-refundable retainers, fee advances,
or advanced fees, prepaid fees, flat fees, and minimum fees. The
basic question is[,] [wihose money is it? If it's the client's money,
in whole or in part, it is subject to trust account requirements....
In general, analysis turns on when the money is deemed 'earned,'
for once the money is earned it is deemed the lawyer's. The
majority of courts and ethics committees addressing the problem
have looked beyond the terminology by which the fee is
characterized, and have determined that fee advances are not
earned when paid, and therefore must be deposited into the trust
account."
92
The Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the State of Missouri
agrees with this position, which is supported by important public policy.
93
Three distinct policy goals may be [implicated]: (1) to preserve the
client's property from the reach of the lawyer's creditors; (2) to
preserve the client's property from possible misappropriation by
the lawyer; and (3) to enable the client to realistically dispute a fee
where the funds are already in the lawyer's possession by
disallowing a self-help resolution by the lawyer and instead
preserving the disputed funds intact until the dispute is resolved.94
Furthermore, the position is in accord with the Missouri Rules of Professional
Conduct 4-1.15(e) and 4-1.16(d).95
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting 45 ABA/BNA LAwYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
109 (1993)).
93. Ripperger, supra note 85, at 21, 23 n.4; Brickman, supra note 76, at 667.
94. Brickman, supra note 76, at 667.
95. "A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses
that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned
or expenses incurred." MO. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(e). "Upon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect
a client's interests, such as ... refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that
has not been earned or incurred." Id. at 4-1.16(d).
2009]
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This section covered MIRA claims and the corresponding law, as well
as the Karpierz attorney fee asset exception. Also examined were the
traditional rules of attorney fees, with particular attention being given to the
use of the word retainer in the context of both earned fees and advanced fee
payments. Next, it is appropriate to explore the instant case and then to
analyze the instant court's application of the law to the facts.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, Hanrahan asserted that the seized funds
held by the Cole County Circuit Court were not available for execution under
the MIRA claim because those funds were assigned to Hanrahan. 96  In
reframing this point, the court found that the critical issue was "whether the
funds held by Cole County [were] assets belonging to Bass."
97
To answer this question, the court sought to interpret Bass'
authorization. 98 First, the court found the authorization was unambiguous.
99
Proceeding with the interpretation, the court set out the general rule for
interpreting an unambiguous contract - that the "parties' intent [is discerned]
from the four comers of the document." 100 Because of the "four comers"
limitation, the court declined to consider extrinsic evidence of Bass' and
Hanrahan's intent.'
1 01
Next, the court considered Hanrahan's argument that the authorization
constituted a valid assignment of the funds.'0 2 Hanrahan's primary authority
was Greater Kansas City Baptist & Community Hospital Ass', Inc. v.
Businessman's Assurance Co. ("BMA").1 °3 The BMA court held that an
96. No. WD 68662, 2008 WL 3833712, at *2 (Mo. App. W.D. Aug. 19, 2008),
transfer granted, No. SC 89666 (Mo. Dec. 16, 2008). Hanrahan also argued that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee Nixon because
Nixon failed to answer Hanrahan's "counterclaim." Id. at *1. The instant court
rejected this point, determining that Hanrahan had "'mistakenly designated [an
affirmative] defense as a counterclaim."' Id. (quoting Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.08).
97. Id. at *2. The majority opinion was written by the Honorable James Edward
Welsh, with the Honorable Paul M. Spinden concurring and the Honorable Alok
Ahuja concurring in part and dissenting in a separate opinion. Id. at * 1, *4.
98. Id. at *2. For the complete language of the authorization, see supra text
accompanying note 10.
99. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *2. The court observed that neither the parties
nor the trial court raised the question of ambiguity in the summary judgment
proceedings. Id. Because it would be improper to raise this issue for the first time on
appeal, a finding of no ambiguity was fitting. Id.
100. Id. (citing J.H. Berra Constr. Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 14
S.W.3d 276, 279 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)).
101. Id. Items of extrinsic evidence offered to the court included affidavits of
Bass and the attorney prosecuting Bass' criminal case. Id.
102. Id. at *3.
103. 585 S.W.2d 118 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979).
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assignment was valid where a patient arranged to pay an already incurred
medical debt by assigning a future insurance benefit payout to the treating
hospital. 1°4 The instant court also took note of the case of Halvorson v.
Commerce Trust Co.,105 cited in BMA4, and remarked that the Halverson court
found that "the payment of a[n earned] real estate commission at a future time
was a valid assignment." 10 6 However, it distinguished the instant case by
pointing out the authorization was not created after a balance had become
due. 10 7  Instead, Bass authorized the release of funds to Hanrahan as an
"initial retainer for legal representation fees."'
08
The court then commented that if the release stated it was to pay for
already earned legal fees, BMA and Halverson would control. 10 9 But, because
the authorization was expressly designated as an initial retainer, which the
court described as a deposit of money made by a client with his attorney for
the payment of future legal fees (hence, an advanced fee payment), an
irrevocable assignment was not effectuated. 110 The court said "[a]n absolute
assignment, one that divests all interest from the assignor to the assignee, [did
not] exist in this case. It [was] clear that the release did not pass all of Bass'[]
title or interest in the funds to Hanrahan ... nor did it divest Bass of all right
of control over the funds; therefore, no assignment occurred.""'
The court then stated that because this advanced fee payment was
maintained in Cole County at the time that Nixon filed his petition for
incarceration reimbursement, the funds were still within Bass' control and the
authorization was subject to revocation." 12 Thus, the court concluded, the
advanced fee "was still an asset belonging to Bass and subject to the
reimbursement statute."'
' 13
104. Id. at 119.
105. 222 S.W. 897 (Mo, App. W.D. 1920).






112. Id. The court further noted that even if the money had been released to
Hanrahan upon the signing of the authorization, it ought to have been placed in the
firm's trust account until the fee was earned, where it "would still [have been] subject
to the State's claim." Id. at *3 n.2.
113. Id. at *3. Next the court considered and rejected construing the writing as a
conditional assignment. Id. ("In a 'conditional assignment for purposes of security'..
. title to the collateral is retained by the assignor subject to his performance of an
independent obligation owed to the assignee."' (quoting Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank
Int'l Corp., 540 F.2d 548, 559 (2d Cir. 1976))); see also Uni-Com Nw., Ltd. v. Argus
Publ'g Co., 737 P.2d 304, 308 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) ("The situation thus described
is one where the debtor has the alternatives of (1) performing the condition and
retaining the collateral or (2) not performing the condition and forfeiting the
collateral."). The court noted that, once again, the issue was not raised in the lower
2009]
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In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Alok Ahuja argued that summary
judgment was an improper disposition of the matter because there was a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bass' attorney owned at
least some of the seized money when the State's MIRA claim ripened."
14
Judge Ahuja first addressed the form of the authorization, noting that while
the contents were "inartful," it "was sufficient to transfer [Bass'] rights to the
seized funds to his attorneys."'"15 The authorization was then compared to the
subject document in BMA and Judge Ahuja found that the two writings were
in essentially the same form.'IY He pointed out that, like the Bass
authorization, the document in BMA contained neither the word "'assign' or
'transfer,' [yet] the BMA court found an effective assignment, since 'the
intention of all concerned [was] clear."" '1 7 Next, Judge Ahuja pointed out
that in the case of Halvorson v. Commerce Trust Co., a valid assignment
existed under language similar to the Bass authorization." 8  Thus, by
analogy, the Bass authorization was an effective assignment.1
9
court and therefore, it would be improper to raise it on appeal. Bass, 2008 WL
3833712, at *3. Second, it noted that the writing did not fit the proper form for a
collateral assignment "because Bass was not seeking to release the funds as collateral
security for a debt." Id. Finally, it remarked that even had the document been
deemed a conditional assignment, it would only have afforded Hanrahan a security
interest in the seized funds, which would have been defeated by the State's superior
priority interest in the inmate's asset. Id.; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
114. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *4 (Ahuja, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
115. Id. "'No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish an assignment,
so long as there appears from the circumstances an intention on the one side to assign
... and on the other side to receive."' Id. (quoting Keisker v. Farmer, 90 S.W.3d 71,
74 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)). The case relied upon by Hanrahan, Greater Kansas City
Baptist & Community Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Businessmen's Assurance Co., 585
S.W.2d 118, 119 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979), also stands for this proposition.
116. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *4.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Halvorson v. Commerce Trust Co., 222 S.W. 897, 897 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1920)). The Halvorson contract read as follows: "'[i]f the sale is finally
concluded, you have our consent to pay over to F.B. Gillette [$3,750] out of said sum
[$10,000], as his commission."' Id. (quoting Halvorson, 222 S.W. at 897).
119. Id. at *4. Judge Ahuja stated:
I do not believe the wording of the Authorization here can fairly be
distinguished from the language of the instruments at issue in BMA, or in
the Halvorson case on which BAIA relied. As in those cases, Bass' intent
to transfer rights to specifically identified funds is clearly expressed in the
writing. This transfer is plainly supported by consideration, since Bass
was aware that Hanrahan . . . would not perform legal services on his
behalf without his execution of the Authorization, and Hanrahan... in
fact represented him thereafter.
[Vol. 74
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However, Judge Ahuja's position that the Bass authorization was an
effective assignment came with a caveat. 20  The caveat concerned the
authorization's designation of the funds for Bass' payment of the initial
retainer to Hanrahan. 21 This "reference [left] open the question of whether
all, or any portion, of those funds remained Bass' property, or had instead
been earned by Hanrahan . . . at the time at which the State's inmate
reimbursement rights attached., 122 The dissenting opinion acknowledged the
majority's description of an initial retainer and the general rule that, to the
extent that an attorney has not earned his fee, "the client ... retains an interest
in the funds."' 23 However, Judge Ahuja suggested that if the fee becomes
earned, the client's interest in the fee is extinguished under this
authorization. 124 He noted that approximately two months elapsed between
the purported date of execution of the Bass authorization, the State's
subsequent dismissal of the forfeiture claim, and Nixon's filing of the
incarceration reimbursement claim.125  During that time, Hanrahan could
have conceivably completed the agreed upon legal services and did in fact
take Bass, "apparently through the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings.'26
Judge Ahuja then expressed concern that denying Hanrahan at least the
amount of the funds equal to that which was earned violated a public policy
of "'assuring inmates' access to legal representation."' 127  The policy is
violated because attorneys would naturally be more averse to undertaking
inmate representation if their earned fees could be easily swept away by a
subsequent MIRA claim.128 He pointed out that it would be consistent with
the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz to
find that, at least to the extent that Hanrahan established that its fees were
earned, the seized funds no longer "'belonged' to Bass."' 29 Thus, under
Karpierz, a court's decision regarding the ownership of an inmate's awarded
or recovered asset must take into consideration any legal "'fees necessary to
procure." it.
130






126. Id. Additionally, another year passed before judgment was entered on the
MIRA action. Id.
127. Id. (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc)).
128. Id.
129. Id. In the Karpierz court's own language, this outcome produced results that
were "suitable, rightful, [and] fitting."' 105 S.W.3d at 490.
130. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *5 (quoting Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d at 491).
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While this line of reasoning was not itself dispositive in the instant case,
Judge Ahuja found it to be influential.' 3 ' Thus, he noted, the extrinsic
evidence ignored by the majority, particularly the affidavits sworn by Bass
and the prosecuting attorney, were relevant. 132 Judge Ahuja pointed out that
the record indicated that Hanrahan was instrumental in negotiating Bass' plea
and testimonial arrangement with the State and obtaining the dismissal of the
forfeiture action. 133 However, because of insufficiencies in the factual record,
Judge Ahuja recommended remanding the case on the "triable issue [of]
whether all, or at least some portion, of the seized funds belonged to
Hanrahan... rather than Bass, at the relevant time."'
134
On March 31, 2009, the Missouri Supreme Court, after hearing
Hanrahan's appeal of the appellate court's affirmation of the trial court
judgment, reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and
remanded the case for hearing on the merits. 13 The Missouri Supreme Court
found "a genuine issue of material fact that the funds at issue were not subject
to incarceration reimbursement in that the funds all, or in part, had previously
been assigned to Hanrahan." 136 Taking up the position set out in Judge
Ahuja's dissenting opinion, the court acknowledged the ambiguity which
exists in the usage of the word "retainer" generally in attorney fee
131. Id.
132. Id. Judge Ahuja noted that:
[The] Bass[] affidavit states ... , '[b]ut for my assurances that I would
pay Hanrahan... such fees, Hanrahan... would not have undertaken to
represent me.' Further, Bass' affidavit states that, but for the State's
agreement to dismiss the pending forfeiture action and release the funds to
Hanrahan... 'as payment of the remainder of my legal fees,' 'I would not
have entered into the said plea agreement.'
Id.; see also supra note 11 (quoting the prosecuting attorney's affidavit).
133. Bass, 2008 WL 3833712, at *5. Judge Ahuja went on to remark that:
In these circumstances - the Authorization's role as an essential condition
of Bass' retention of counsel, and counsel's performance of services for
Bass; counsel's participation in 'creation' of the fund through dismissal of
the forfeiture action; and the State's knowledge that the funds it had
agreed to release (as a material aspect of Bass' plea agreement) would be
used to pay counsel - I believe the Supreme Court's holding in Karpierz
provides further support for a determination that the seized funds were not
'property... belonging to' Bass, and therefore that these funds were not
subject to incarceration reimbursement.
Id. (quoting Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d at 490).
134. Id. at *6 ("[O]ne can[not] resolve the issue whether [Hanrahan] had in fact
earned all or part of the seized funds, as a matter of undisputed fact, on the existing
summary judgment record.").
135. State ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. SC89666, at 6 (Mo. Mar. 31, 2009) (en
banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file/OpinionSC89666.pdf.
136. Id. at 2.
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agreements. 137 It then remarked that the record in the instant case was less
than clear with respect to the terms and conditions of the subject fee
agreement. 38 The court remanded with instructions that:
[i]f . . . the authorization was an essential condition of Bass'
retention of counsel and counsel's performance of services for Bass;
counsel participated in "creation" of the funds through dismissal of
the forfeiture action; and the State knew that the funds it had agreed
to release (as a material aspect of Bass' plea agreement) would be
used to pay counsel then, this case would be controlled by State ex
rel. Nixon v. Karpierz.
139
In the Bass appellate court decision, the majority focused primarily on
the traditional rules of attorney fees to determine the appropriate asset
allocation under MIRA. The dissent emphasized the possibility that
Hanrahan had actually earned its fee. It further recommended the
consideration of the Karpierz exception for attorney fees to mitigate the
potential harshness of flat adherence to the traditional attorney fee rules and
to further public policy goals. The Missouri Supreme Court found the record
on appeal insufficient to support summary judgment for the State and
remanded the case for consideration in accordance with the approach
suggested by the appellate dissent. The next section will set out that,
although the appellate majority probably arrived at the correct outcome given
the facts in this case, the dissent's analysis of the problem under the Karpierz
exception was indeed the more technically correct approach to take.
137. Id. at 4-5, 5 n.2. For a discussion of Judge Ahuja's dissenting opinion, see
supra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 5-6 ("There is no other reference in the record to the terms of the
parties' agreement as to Hanrahan['s] .. . fees, and specifically concerning when and
how those fees would be earned.")
139. Id. at 6 n.4.
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V. COMMENT
A comparison of the facts of State ex. rel Nixon v. Bass with those of
State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz indiciates that the two cases share several
significant similarities. 140 Thus, it seems logical to analyze Bass in light of
the holding of Karpierz. The Bass majority's decision not to include
Karpierz in its discussion was therefore surprising.14 1 Instead of utilizing
Karpierz, the Bass court proceeded directly to an analysis under the
"traditional" rules of attorney fees, finding that, first, Hanrahan did not earn
the funds based on the authorization language and, second, that the State's
incarceration reimbursement claim had priority over any lesser interest that
Hanrahan might have in the funds.1
42
140. First, each case arose from the State's filing of a MIRA petition. See supra
notes 14 & 41 and accompanying text. Second, the courts in both cases focused on
MIRA's definition of an "asset." See supra notes 46-51, 97, 112-13 and
accompanying text. Third, the 'pools' of money targeted by the MIRA claims arose
from cash which was seized during criminal arrests and thereafter subject to
governmental forfeitures, but which were ultimately liberated through at least some
attorney effort. See supra notes 6-7, 11-12, 40 and accompanying text. Fourth, the
attorney in each case had an attorney fee agreement with the client whereby at least
some portion of the legal fee would be taken out of the recovery of the seized funds.
See supra notes 9-10, 43-44 and accompanying text. Fifth, in each case there were
facts on the record that would suggest that, at the time the MIRA claim was filed, the
inmate's attorney had "earned" his agreed upon fee. See supra notes 40, 43, 122-26
and accompanying text. And finally, the objecting attorney in each case defended his
right to take his attorney fee from the created "pool" before the MIRA claim was
applied. See supra notes 15-16, 43 and accompanying text.
141. Only the dissenting judge's opinion made reference to Karpierz. Bass, 2008
WL 3833712, at * 5 (Ahuja, J., concurring in part and dissenting). Another portion of
the Bass opinion is also perplexing. The court suggested that, "[h]ad Bass's [sic]
release said 'for payment of legal fees,"' the outcome would have been different. Id.
at *3 (majority opinion). The implication was that, if the attorney fee was already
earned and simply due at the time of execution, the authorization would have
effectuated a valid transfer of Bass' interest to Hanrahan. By extension, then, the
seized funds would no longer have been an asset belonging to Bass for the purposes
of the MIRA claim. However, what the court overlooked in this analysis was the fact
that the funds at issue were, at the relevant times, in the hands of a third party. Thus,
even a valid assignment would have given Hanrahan no more than a contractually
enforceable interest in the property. Against many other competing claims, this
interest would perhaps have prevailed, but not necessarily against the MIRA action.
This is because MIRA contains a provision which gives the State's claim priority over
other encumbrances. Mo. REv. STAT. § 217.837.4 (2000). Therefore, it is not entirely
clear that a valid assignment of these funds would actually have made a difference in
the outcome of this case.
142. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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However, in a MIRA claim, this "traditional" analysis, by itself, does
not foreclose the opposite result. Under the application of the Karpierz asset
exception in MIRA claims, the "asset due or belonging" issue must be
resolved before any priority issue.143 Framed in this manner, the decision in a
Bass-type case should discuss whether the Karpierz asset exception was
applicable or whether only the "traditional" rules of attorney fees applied. In
order to explore this in a more coherent fashion, the argument in favor of the
application of Karpierz will be set out first, followed by the argument against
allowing the exception.
The strongest arguments in favor of applying the Karpierz asset
exception to the attorney fee in Bass are based on the policies and rationales
espoused by the Missouri Supreme Court in Karpierz. First, although the
released funds in the instant case were not recovered in a plaintiff's action,
the record indicates that Hanrahan did in fact perform legal services for Bass.
The legal services presumably had value, because, as a result of the attorney's
successful negotiations, the CAFA case was dismissed. Therefore, to the
extent that services were performed, Hanrahan's fee was earned. If the fee
was earned at the time that the MIRA judgment became executable against
the released CAFA funds, Karpierz indicates that the earned legal fee should
be excluded from the State's recovery. 144 Furthermore, the Karpierz opinion
did not indicate that a contingent fee arrangement for the defense of a civil
case was specifically excluded from its umbrella of protection.
45
Second, but for Hanrahan's action, the "pool" of money at issue would
not have been available to the State for a MIRA claim. Extrinsic evidence
presented by Hanrahan suggested that the firm's legal services were
instrumental in the final disposition of the CAFA case. 14 6 While in this case
the recovered amount was the same amount as the attorney's claimed fee, in
other cases this pool might contain overflow to which a MIRA claim could
attach. Thus, the holding in Bass would have a chilling effect on future
inmate defendant fee arrangements of this type and the State will experience
lost opportunities for future MIRA recoveries.
Third, the application of Karpierz furthers the public policy of
encouraging attorneys to represent inmates by assuring that their earned fees
will not be preempted by a MIRA claim. Moreover, as a collateral matter, the
very nature of a CAFA case lends support to the notion that advocating an
inmate's defense should qualify the attorney to raise the Karpierz fee
exclusion because, in a sense, the traditional party roles in a CAFA case are
reversed. In a CAFA case, it is the plaintiff who has possession of the asset
and the defendant who is actively attempting to "recover." Thus, a favorable
recovery of assets may be attained even where the defendant has filed no
143. In fact, if the traditional attorney fee rules were applied to the case in
Karpierz without other consideration, the State's MIRA claim would have prevailed.
144. State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
145. See generally id. at 488-91.
146. See supra notes 11-12, 133 and accompanying text.
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independent cause of action. Although contingent fees are most often
associated with claimants' recoveries, courts have noted that nothing in the
nature of contingent fees limits their use to plaintiffs' attorneys, especially in
CAFA-type claims.1
47
However, one might argue on three different grounds that the Karpierz
exception should not be applicable to the analysis of Bass. The proponent of
this position would first point out that there are differences between the two
cases' respective representational and fee agreements. It is arguable that the
Karpierz asset exception was only intended to protect attorneys who represent
plaintiff inmates. The fact that Missouri does not provide a statutorily
codified charging lien for the defense of a case lends support to this
argument. 1
48
Additionally, the record in Bass does not indicate that Hanrahan took an
active role in defending the CAFA case itself, thus the firm did little to
"create" the "pool" at issue here. At best, it appears that Hanrahan may have
negotiated a plea and testimonial agreement in the underlying criminal case
which passively caused Bass' money to be released from the CAFA action.
This type of arrangement does not seem to comport with the spirit of
Karpierz. Why should an attorney be able to actively work one case to its
resolution, and then passively reap his reward from the disposition of a
separate case? In this situation, it seems equitable that the attorney should
recover after MIRA.
Finally, it could be argued that the type of fee agreement in Bass raises
ethical concerns and therefore should not be condoned by the courts.
Particularly alarming is the arrangement where a criminal defense attorney
takes a personal interest in the outcome of a related CAFA case as security
for his attorney fee in the criminal case. "49 While not expressly prohibited by
rules of professional conduct, 150 the arrangement does create the appearance
147. Rossi, supra note 81, at 93.
148. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 484.130-.140 (2000) (both sections require recovery
from a client's cause of action or claim, to which the charging lien attaches); Evans v.
FDIC, 981 F.2d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Section 484.130 is expressly for the
purpose of protecting counsel who undertake filing a lawsuit or a counterclaim on
behalf of his or her client ...." (emphasis added)); Orr v. Mut. Benefit Health &
Accident Ass'n., 207 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. App. W.D. 1947) ([S]ection [484.140] has to
do only with contingent fee contracts, and authorizes such agreements, including fee
percentage of the proceeds of any settlement of the client's cause of action before or
after suit or judgment, or whether or not any action shall be commenced, and provides
that if the attorney shall serve the defendant or proposed defendant with a notice in
writing that he has such a fee contract ..." (emphasis added)).
149. The concern arises from Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.5(d)(2),
which states: "A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect[] a
contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case." Mo. R. PROF'L
CONDUCT 4-1.5(d)(2).
150. Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.7(a) provides that "a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest."
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and at least the potential that the attorney's personal interest in the recovery
of the seized assets may color the counsel given to the criminal client.' 51 For
these reasons, the court could choose to discourage this particular type of
arrangement by allowing a subsequent MIRA action to preempt the attorney's
interest in the seized assets.
152
So, given the strengths of the two positions on the applicability of
Karpierz to the instant case, it becomes apparent that, regardless of its
ultimate applicability to the facts at hand, Karpierz simply should have been
addressed by the Bass court. Without that analysis, the picture is incomplete.
However, the Bass opinion does serve one important function in that it
reinforces the realities of the perhaps misused and often confused concept of
Id. at 4-1.7(a). Rule 4-1.7(a)(2) indicates that "a personal interest of the lawyer" is a
concurrent conflict of interest. Id. at 4-1.7(a)(2). According to Comment 10 to Rule
4-1.7, the reasoning behind this rule is that, "[tihe lawyer's own interests should not
be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client." Id. at 4-1.7 cmt.
10. However, the representation may proceed if: 1) the attorney "reasonably
believes" he can provide representation that is uninfluenced by his personal interest;
2) the representation is not otherwise prohibited by the law; 3) it does not involve two
adverse clients of the same lawyer; and 4) "each affected client gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing." Id. at 4-1.7(b)(1)-(4).
151. The primary concern arises from the limited avenues of recovery on the
CAFA case. For a criminal defendant, there are three basic options for recovering
seized funds held pursuant to a related CAFA action. First, the defendant could
prevail based on a procedural error made by the government. See State v. Sims, 124
S.W.3d 486, 488 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) ("Forfeitures are not favored in the law and
should be enforced only when both the letter and the spirit of the law authorizing the
forfeiture are followed. Thus, forfeiture statutes are strictly construed against the
state .... (citations omitted)). Second, if the criminal defendant wins his criminal
case, he automatically wins the CAFA case. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.617.1 (2000)
(When "criminal charges arising from the same activity giving rise to the CAFA
proceeding are filed . . . no property [is] forfeited unless the [defendant] is found
guilty of or pleads guilty to a felony offense substantially related to the forfeiture.").
These two options raise no ethical concerns. The third option is that a settlement
agreement may be reached. Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.617.3. It is this option that poses
the ethical issue because of the risk that the attorney's interest in the CAFA assets
may influence the counsel given in the criminal case.
152. The recent Missouri Supreme Court opinion on the instant matter does not
address the possibility of ethical concerns in a Bass-type fee arrangement. See State
ex rel. Nixon v. Bass, No. SC89666 (Mo. Mar. 31, 2009) (en banc), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file/OpinionSC89666.pdf. However, two parts of the
Supreme Court's instructions on remand appear to leave the door open for just such a
contemplation. The trial court is to determine whether "the authorization was an
essential condition of Bass' retention of counsel and counsel's performance of
services for Bass; [and whether] counsel participated in 'creation' of the funds
through dismissal of the forfeiture action." Id. at 6 n.4. If the facts demonstrate the
existence of an impermissible contingent fee in a criminal case, the arrangement is
per se invalid and thus could not be enforced as either an essential condition of
representation or as a conduit for the creation of additional funds.
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the advanced attorney fee payment. Practicing attorneys are reminded that an
attempted assignment of client assets to satisfy an advanced attorney fee
payment results in, at best, a secured interest in the property, which may be
defeated by claims with superior priority. The result is the same regardless of
when the advanced fee becomes an earned fee. To the extent that the attorney
is not in control of the asset, the interest in the asset is just that, an interest.
Perhaps for some attorneys, this seems like a harsh result.
While the advanced fee payment lesson is useful, the court missed out
on other, perhaps more significant, opportunities to complete the picture. In
Bass, the court could have affirmatively explained why the Karpierz
exception was inapplicable in a Bass-type fee arrangement. Karpierz clearly
affords protection to statutorily codified contingent fee charging liens.
However, its coverage should not be extended to passive interests taken in
'pools' of client funds, which serve merely to secure an attorney in a separate
or unrelated case. Conversely, the Karpierz protection should extend to
attorneys who obtain valid contingent fee charging liens which arise from the
active defense of CAFA-type cases.
Another opportunity missed was the consideration of the potential
ethical issues which may arise in a Bass-type fee agreement. Under the
general prohibition against contingent fees in criminal cases, it is
questionable whether an attorney should take a personal interest in client
funds that are at least potentially dependent upon the outcome of the client's
pending criminal case. The Bass court could have sent a warning to attorneys
by explicitly refusing to apply the Karpierz exception to such arrangements.
The rationale for this message is straightforward. First, criminal clients
cannot compensate their attorneys via contingent attorney fee agreements.
Second, if the Bass criminal fee agreement was in fact contingent, it was
unethical and invalid. Third, if it was not a contingent fee agreement, then
the Karpierz protection was inapplicable. The unprotected fee in either
outcome sends a clear message to attorneys: there is inherent risk in this
potentially unethical type of fee arrangement. By remaining silent, the court
left this area of the law open to further ethical uncertainty.
Finally, the Bass opinion allowed the scope of MIRA to grow. Under
the Bass holding, the State is now more emboldened to actively pursue even
those legitimately earned attorney fees arising from the active defense of
CAFA cases. In theory, the Karpierz asset exception should be an applicable
shield for attorney fee charging liens against CAFA assets that are earned as a
result of a successful CAFA defense. Unfortunately, after Bass, whether this
protection will be afforded to defending attorneys is less than clear. Under
the current state of the law, the chance exists that even an actively earned
defending attorney fee charging lien could be lost to the State in a subsequent
MIRA claim. This truly would be a harsh result.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Bass majority's failure to address Karpierz in its opinion makes the
law less clear than before. It is possible to take the court's holding and the
absence of a discussion of Karpierz to mean that, by implication, the
exception is inapposite. However, even with that inference, the reader of the
Bass opinion is left to wonder what particular factor in Bass was
determinative in making Karpierz inapplicable and whether, in the future,
defense attorneys could ever invoke the latter's fee-protective umbrella.
Thus, Bass effectively muddies the MIRA waters and makes the limits and
applicability of the Karpierz asset exception more confusing. Given the
Missouri Supreme Court's recent reversal and remand in the matter, the lower
courts now have another chance to clear up the confusion.
CARRIE B. WILLIAMSON. 53
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